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I. INTRODUCTION

"Poor Mexico, so far from God and so near to the United States."
-

Porfirio Diaz

The Mexican Revolution of 1910 was a turning point in the history of
Mexican labor. The once exploited working class of Mexico was given
a written document defining the social rights of workers and protecting
the working class. 2 The laws announced in the 1917 Mexican Constitution
afford enormous protections to the people of the working class 3 and
may, in some cases, exceed the current labor laws that exist in the
United States.4 Although Mexican labor laws are an excellent source of
I.
2.

Ruler of Mexico from 1876 to 1910.

CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS art. 123
[hereinafter The Mexican Constitution].
3. See generally LINDA ESCANDON OJEDA & MARINA L.C. BOTTONE, Mexican
Labor Law, in MEXICAN LAW: A TREATISE FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND
INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS 151, 153 (Jorge A. Vargas ed., West Publishing 1998).

4. See Elizabeth C. Crandall, Comment, Will NAFTA's North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation Improve Enforcement of Mexican Labor Laws?, 7
TRANSNAT'L LAW 165, 176 (1994) (describing the 1917 Mexican Constitution as
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protection for the working class on paper, in reality, the lack of
enforcement by the federal and state governments substantially hinders
the effect of such laws.5
There are several theories why the Mexican government has refused to
enforce the stringent laws enumerated in the Mexican Constitution. For
example, the North American Social Dumping Theory 6 and Mexico's
desire to retain foreign direct investment from foreign countries as a
source of revenue and employment.7 This comment seeks to analyze
and expound on these theories and to develop
two additional theories
8
that have only been discussed in passing.
Part II begins with a brief look at the history of Mexican labor,
including pre and post-Revolution working conditions. Part II also
details the various components of Mexico's 1917 Constitution, the
policies behind its passage, and provisions for its statutory enforcement.
A summary description of Mexico's Federal Labor Law follows,
including a brief overview of the Federal Labor Law inspection process.
Part III discusses Mexico's encouragement and protection of foreign
direct investment and the impact that this has on how labor laws are

containing stringent laws that even the United States does not have, including right to
share in employer's profits and dismissal only for cause).
5. See, e.g., id. (arguing that despite laws allowing such activities as the right to
associate and minimum wages, in practice, Mexican workers do not have the benefit of
such rights); see also, Barry LaSala, NAFTA and Worker Rights: An Analysis of the
Labor Side Accord After Five Years of Operation and Suggested Improvements, 16 LAB.
LAW. 319, 334 (2001) (explaining how the laws of Mexico are sufficient to protect
worker's rights, there continue to be frequent and continuing violations of these laws due
to non-enforcement).
6. See Michael Joseph McGuinness, The Politics of Labor Regulation In North
America: A Reconsideration of Labor Law Enforcement in Mexico, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 1, 3 (2000) (discussing and ultimately rejecting the argument that the United
States would use Mexico as a place for industrialists to transfer its operations to Mexico
in an effort to avoid stringent labor and environmental laws).
7. See, e.g., John P. Isa, Testing the NAALC's Dispute Resolution System: A Case
Study, 6 AM. U.J. GENDER & L., 615, 632-33 (1998) (arguing that Mexico sees the
benefits of foreign direct investment as outweighing the costs of enforcement since
foreign direct investment contributes to employment, technology, and diversity).
8.

See, e.g., FREDERICK W. MAYER, INTERPRETING NAFTA: THE SCIENCE AND

ART OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS 167 (Columbia University Press 1998) (discussing the
passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the political pressure felt by
presidential candidate, Bill Clinton); Robert E. Herzstein, The Labor Cooperation
Agreement Among Mexico, Canada, and the United States: Its Negotiation and
Prospects, 3 U.S.-MEx L.J. 121 (1995) (discussing the rapid drafting of the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and the political controversy surrounding its
passing).

enforced in Mexico. Part III seeks to prove that the Mexican government
has been willing to take drastic measures to ensure continued flow of
foreign investment into Mexico, including changing existing laws and
policies and ignoring historic legislation designed to protect the working
class. Part III also seeks to expound on the North American Social
Dumping Theory and prove why there may be some merit to the
argument that the United States and other countries exploit Mexico as a
cheap source of labor.
Part IV discusses the politics behind the passage of the North
American Free Trade Agreement and seeks to explain how the political
pressures surrounding the passage of the agreement led to criticism and
created downfalls in the drafting process. Part IV also summarizes some
of NAFTA's main provisions and discusses how the weaknesses in this
agreement, created between two developed and one developing nation,
are adversely affecting the Mexican working class.
Part V concludes by exploring the political controversy surrounding
the passage of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. It
will be explained how the Agreement that was designed to save NAFTA
from its downfalls of excluding labor and environmental issues from its
text has failed to fulfill this objective. Part V also seeks to prove the
failure of the NAALC to impose adequate means to influence Mexico to
comply with its labor laws, evidenced by cases that have been brought
against Mexico under the NAALC statutory regime.
II. MEXICAN LABOR LAWS
A. The PastRevealed
1. Pre-1910 Conditions of the Working Class
The typical day for an individual working in Mexico before 1910
consisted of backbreaking work performed with no safety or health
regulations for long hours with minuscule amounts of compensation. 9
The factories would open early in the morning, lock their doors, and not
allow any of the workers to leave until late in the evening.' 0 The
factories and mining operations regarded injury, even death, as an

9. See, e.g., Michael Joseph McGuinness, The Landscape of Labor Law Enforcement
in North America: An Examination of Mexico's Labor Regulatory Policy and Practice,
29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 365, 370 (1998).
10.

RAMON EDUARDO Ruiz, TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDY: A HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN

PEOPLE 281 (Norton & Company 1992) (describing the condition of Mexico in industrial
sectors as factories opening at five or six in the morning and not closing until eight or
nine at night).
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everyday occurrence and did not seek to prevent such tragedies."1
Housing conditions were atrocious, consisting of caves, shacks, or huts
made of mud. 12 These bleak conditions led to the inevitable result that
hundreds of thousands of Mexicans became ill and died. 13 Strikes were
illegal, and rulers of the industry made it perfectly clear that workers
were not allowed to "take the law into their own hands."'14 The only
thing that could help was a revolution of dramatic proportions.
2. Post 1910: The PaternalisticState of Mexico
a. Constitucion Politicasde los Estados Unidos
Mexicanos: The
15
Mexican Constitution
The Mexican Revolution of 1910 was a struggle to obtain political
reform. 16 Mexican workers' organizations and unions joined the fight to
overthrow the political regime to protect the rights of the Mexican
working class.' In the wake of the Revolution, Mexico's founders saw
laborers as a vulnerable group in need of State protection from the abuse
of wealthy capitalists. 18 Relying on the concept of paternalism, 19 the
framers of the Mexican Constitution took responsibility for individual
citizen affairs by providing full protection of worker's rights, a
commitment to improve citizen's living and working conditions, and to
respect human dignity. 20 Regarded as the fruit of the Revolution, the
1917 Constitution sought to express the popular will, guarantee civil

11.

Id. (citing that in one mine there were over five hundred deaths within a four-

year time span).
12. Id. at 282.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 283 (the codigo penal of 1872 levied a fine or jail sentence on anyone
who tried to force a modification of wages or impede the free exercise of labor).
15. The Mexican Constitution, art. 123; MExIcO: A COUNTRY STUDY 234 (Tim L.
Merrill & Ramon Miro eds., Library of Congress 1997) (Mexico's first constitution was
the Acta Constitutiva de law Federacion Mexicanca (Constituent Act of the Mexican
Federation). Created in 1824, this charter-like document established a federal republic
with a divided central government consisting of a bicameral congress and federal
judiciary).
16. See generally MExIco: A COUNTRY GUIDE, 4 (Tom Barry ed., Inter-Hemispheric

Education Resource Center 1992).
17.

DAN LA BoTz, MASK OF DEMOCRACY: LABOR SUPPRESSION IN MEXICO TODAY

62 (South End Press 1992).
18. McGuinness, supra note 9, at 370.
19. Id.
20. The Mexican Constitution, art. 123.

rights, and protect citizens from foreign and domestic exploitation. 2
The groundwork for Mexico's current labor laws are found in Title
VI, Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution. Described as one of the
"most advanced labor codes in the world at its time,, 22 various sections
of Article 123 combine to describe an employment regime that mirrors
23
utopia. The maximum workday for a Mexican worker is eight hours
and the minimum wage must be "sufficient to satisfy the normal
material, social, and cultural needs of heads of a family and provide for
the compulsory education of his children. 24 Each worker is granted the
right to organize by forming unions 25 and a right to strike. 26 The
Constitution, however, is not the only protection that is afforded
Mexican workers.
27
b. Ley Federalde Trabajo: The FederalLabor Law

Pursuant to Article 123, the original Federal Labor Law ("FLL") was
enacted in 1931 to carry out the policies and principles announced in the
Mexican Constitution by choosing labor standards that would ensure
28
social justice and a balance of power between labor and management.
AS delineated below, the FLL has since been amended
and reflects the
29
status of Mexican labor laws that currently exist.

i. FederalLabor Law Provisions
Title I addresses the general principles of labor laws 30 and their
purpose to "seek to achieve balance and social justice in relations
between workers and employees." 3I Article 3 defines the right to work
as a "social right and obligation" that "requires the respect for the rights
and dignity of those who may provide it." 32 Article 3 also prohibits
21.
See MEXICO: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 15 at 41; id. at 236 (the 1917
Constitution has been referred to as the most radical and comprehensive constitution in
modern political history and closely replicates the liberal principle and concepts in the
United States Constitution, including federalism, separation of powers, and a Bill of
Rights).

22. Id. at 237.
23. The Mexican Constitution Title VI, art. 123(I).
24. Id. art. 123(VI).
25. Id. art. 123(XVI).
26. Id. art. 123(XVII).
27. LEY FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO DE 1990 [hereinafter Federal Labor Law or F.L.L.].
28. McGuinness, supra note 9, at 371.
29. OJEDA & BOTrONE, supra note 3, at 156 (the FLL has been amended numerous
times with the most recent FLL (1990 amendment) composed of sixteen titles).
30.
31.

F.L.L. Title I. arts 1-19.
Id. art. 2.

32.

Id. art 3.
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discrimination, encourages training of employees, and provides
33 for safe
conditions in the workplace and a "decent standard of living."
Other relevant sections within Title I include Article 5, which provides
' 34
for a minimum wage and a workday that is not "unreasonably excessive,
and Article 7, which guarantees that the labor force in any establishment
shall be composed of at least 90 percent Mexican workers.35 Title III
regulates individual labor conditions.36 In general, these articles include
the number of days in a workweek,37 vacation pay,38 and compulsory
profit sharing.39
Title IV imposes certain obligations on behalf of Mexican employers.4 °
Some of these include observing current labor standards, providing
employees with the instruments necessary to carry out their jobs,
"abstain[ing] from ill-treatment", and abiding by the safety regulations
to prevent illness and injury. I Also, employers are assigned certain
prohibitions, including the strict prohibition
to compel or refrain
•
42
employees from joining a labor organization. The language of Title IV
also requires employers to provide housing for their emplol'ees 43 and
train employees so that they can raise their standard of living.
Title VII of the Federal Labor Law of Mexico identifies collective

33. Id. ("[Work] must be conducted under conditions which assure the life, health,
and a decent standard of living of the worker and his family. There may be no difference
established between workers on the basis of race, sex, age, religious creed, political
philosophy, or social condition. In addition, it is in society's best interest to promote and
oversee the education and training of workers").
34. F.L.L. art. 5. (other provisions include: gender equality, regulating child labor
under the age of fourteen, and time of payment).
35. Id. art. 7 ("In any enterprise or establishment, at least 90% of workers hired by
the employer must be Mexican").
36. F.L.L. arts. Title III. 56-131.
37. Id. art. 61 (the standard work week is comprised of six days with one day off
for rest).
38. Id. arts. 76-81 (entitled to six days paid vacation in the first year of service).
39. OJEDA & BoTrONE, supra note 3, at 164 (stating that a percentage of the gross
profits of a company will be set by the National Commission for Workers' ProfitSharing in Enterprises, currently set at ten percent).
40. F.L.L. Title IV. arts. 132-163.
41. Id. art. 132.
42. Id. art. 134-35; (Title IV, article 136 also contains employee obligations and
prohibitions, including compliance with labor standards, safety regulations, and
refraining from any behavior that could endanger the safety of the employee or other
employees).
43. Id. art. 136.
44. Id. art. 153.

labor relations 5 Collective labor agreements, entered into by either
employers or workers, govern Mexico and have led to the unionization
of about twenty-five percent of the labor force in Mexico. 46 Title VII
requires an employer who hires union workers to enter into a collective
labor agreement,a but even where there is no agreement, the Federal
Labor Law will continue to control the relationship. 48 Workers are free
to associate and to form
49 trade unions, but are not obligated to join or
prevented from joining.
Title IX of the Federal Labor Law requires employers to comply with
safety and health regulations to prevent occupational injuries and diseases
and to inform employees of these regulations by displaying them at the
workplace. 50 Title IX's general principles promoting workplace health
and safety is implemented through the General Regulations Governing
Workplace Safety and Hygiene. 5' These regulations provide the necessary
link between workplace safety and health to standards established by the
Federal Law of Measurement and Standards under the Official Mexican
Standards.5 2
The Mexican Constitution sets forth the general principle that every
Mexican worker is to be given the social ri ht to work and to be treated
in a dignified and non-exploitive manner.
The Federal Labor Law
complemented the Mexican Constitution by further providing regulations
on the relationship that must exist between an employer and his
45. F.L.L. arts. 354-471.
46. Id. art. 386 ("A collective labor agreement is the agreement entered into by one
or more unions and one or more employers, or one or more employer's unions, for the
purpose of establishing employment conditions in one or more enterprises or
establishments."); see id. art. 391 (detailing what a collective labor agreement must
contain, including: workdays, vacation days, wages, training, and the duration of the
agreement); availableat www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/index.cfm, as of 2000.
47. Id. art. 387 (describing how an employer is obligated to enter into a collective
labor agreement if a union member requests and if such request is denied, then the
members has a right to strike).
48. OJEDA & BOTrONE, supra note 3, at 172.
49. F.L.L. arts. 386-489.
50. F.L.L. arts. 472-515.
51. General Regulations Governing Workplace Safety and Hygiene, in MEXICAN
LAWS

AND

REGULATIONS

GOVERNING

OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY

AND

HEALTH

ADMINISTRATION 81 (U.S. Department of Labor Jan. 1993) (discussed later in further
detail).
52.

Ley Organica De La Administracion Publica Federal 1976 (referred to as

Normas Oficiales Mexicanas or OMS's, this regime defines standards such as the
appropriate amount of noise (NOM-010-STPS- 1993), vibration (NOM-01 1-STPS- 1993),
temperature (NOM-012-STPS-1993), and chemicals in the workplace (NOM-025-STPS1993)).
53. The Mexican Constitution, art. 123 (establishing fundamental labor standards
that assure dignified working conditions, including: a mandatory minimum wage, an
eight-hour workday, a maximum six-day work week, and the freedom to associate, form
unions, and strike).
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workers.54 Neither the Constitution nor the Federal Labor Law, however,
policies. 55
provide mechanisms to enforce the enumerated principles and
B. Statutory Enforcement of Mexico's Labor Principles

The Mexican Constitution provides that state and local government56

law.
personnel have exclusive authority to enforce federal labor
Despite giving the authority to the state and local governments, the
Constitution does not provide any guidance on how to go about
enforcing the stringent laws contained in its text.57
The 1993 Foreign Investment Law delegates enforcement of Mexican
labor laws to the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare.5 8 The Ministry's
responsibilities include enforcing existing labor standards, developing

new standards, organizing inspections of workplaces, reducing work
risks, imposing employer sanctions, and disseminating information.5 9
The most important Ministerial weapon to enforce the policies and
principles created in the Mexican Constitution and the Federal Labor
Law is the inspection of workplaces.

54. F.L.L. Title I, art.l ("The present law is of general observance throughout the
Republic and governs the employment relations included within article 123, Section A,
of the Constitution.").
55. See, e.g., LaSala, supra note 5, at 320 (noting that Mexico has adequate labor
standards, but lacks the necessary mechanisms to enforce its laws).
56. The Mexican Constitution, Title VI, Article 123(XXXI) (State and local
governments have exclusive authority to enforce labor laws except in three instances: (1)
where enforcement relates to one of those twenty-two industries historically considered
to be strategic; (2) where enforcement relates to any industry which is administered
directly or indirectly by the federal government, administered directly or indirectly by
the federal government, functions by virtue of a federal contract or concession, or
operates in a federal zone; (3) where enforcement involves any of the following legal
issues: (a) conflicts between two or more federal entities; (b) collective contracts
obligatory in more than one federal entity; (c) employer obligations for worker training
and education or employer obligations for workplace health and safety).
57.
See McGuinness, supra note 6, at 4 (describing Mexico's labor laws enforcement
practices as "disorganized, ineffectual, and corrupt.").
58. L.I.F art. 523.
59. Ley Organica De La Administracion Publica Federal 1976, art. 40 [hereinafter
F.P.A.A.].

60

1. The FederalInspection Process.

Inspections have been used throughout history to verify employer
compliance with federal and state labor laws. English law was the first
to require inspectors to enter factories, conduct investigations, and report
to the appropriate governmental authority. 61 Inspections became an
important tool to verify compliance with labor laws, became a fixture in
international law, was mentioned in several International Labor Office
conventions, 62 and remains a prominent weapon in Mexico's artillery to
enforce federal labor law.63
Inspections of Mexican industrial sectors are conducted bi-annually
via the General Division for Federal Labor Inspection ("GDFLI"). 64 The
GDFLI conducts investigations of general work conditions and workplace
safety and health. 65 The Ministry creates official Inspection Protocols
detailing the inspection procedure to assist the inspectors, which consists
of interviewing the employer and at least three employees. 66 After the
inspection, the inspector writes up an official Inspection Report containing
his findings.67 This report is then considered in the decision whether to
impose sanctions on the employer for violations of federal labor law.68
The inspection process appears to be an efficient and effective tool
utilized in Mexico to force employers to comply with federal and state
60. All information contained in this comment regarding Mexican labor law
inspections, unless otherwise specified, derives from Michael J. McGuinness who spent
nearly two years conducting research on the inspection process in Mexico City. Given
the label of quasi labor inspector, Michael participated in federal labor inspections
throughout Mexico and extensive questioning of federal labor law inspectors. Michael
Joseph McGuinness, The Landscape of Labor Law Enforcement in North America: An
Examination of Mexico's Labor Regulatory Policy and Practice,29 LAw & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 365 (1998).
61. Id.atn.3.
62. Id. (The Treaty of Versailles states, "[e]ach State should make provision for a
system of inspection in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for
the protection of the employed," § 2 art. 427, June 28, 1919).
63. F.L.L. Title XI art. 541 (explaining that the powers of the inspectors include
ensuring that the labor norms are observed, the inspection of establishments, the
questioning of workers and employers, and to suggest any non-observance be corrected).
64. McGuinness, supra note 60, at 385.
65. Id. at 380 (the work conditions compliance inspection consists of verifying
compliance with such things as contracts, holidays, vacations, and profit-sharing, while
the safety and health inspection verify compliance with fire prevention measures,
handling of toxic substances, and environmental conditions).
66. McGuinness, supra note 6, at 12.
67. McGuinness, supra note 60, at 387 (the report may include such things as a
review of business documents, first-hand observations of conditions, declarations made
by workers, and improvements suggested by the inspector. This report is then used to
decide whether to impose sanctions on the employer for violations of federal labor law).
68. McGuinness, supra note 6, at 14 (stating that Ministry officials based their
decision to begin a sanctioning procedure based on an evaluation of the official
Inspection Report.).
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labor laws. In reality, the process has its weaknesses. Federal labor law
requires employers to admit inspectors and to provide them with any
documentation necessary to conduct a thorough inspection.69 Once inside
the factory, most inspectors have to take on not only the employer, but
also resistant employees and managers. 70 There are five potential barriers
that frustrate the efficient and effective inspection process laid out by the
Ministry of Labor.7'
a. The Barriersto Effective Investigations
The three most applicable barriers that prevent explicit objectives from
becoming effective enforcement procedures are (1) employer resistance,
(2) inspector corruption, and (3) labor union indifference.7
i. Employer Resistance
Inspectors are met with fierce employer resistance.73 Such resistance
can be attributed to four kinds of employers. 74 Employers who are
incapable of complying with the inspection, disinclined employers who
are uncooperative and often abusive, outraged employers who use
intimidation, and sometimes physical force against inspectors, or corrupt
employers who use illegal means to sway the results of the inspection
process.
ii. Inspector Corruption
Some inspectors are willing to extort money from employers to cast
the employer's factory in a more favorable light.75 Corrupt inspectors
force employers to illicit money by threatening to write up a bad inspection
69. F.P.A.A. art 40. (putting the organizing of initial, periodic, verification, and
special inspections in the hands of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare).
70. McGuinness, supranote 60, at 401.
71. Id. (the barriers are theorized by Michael J. McGuinness. Only three barriers
are relevant to the discussion and therefore only three will be discussed).
72. Id. (the other two barriers are joint commission apathy and the overdocumentation of inspection procedure).
73. Id. (noting that at least one-third of employers block or unnecessarily
complicate the efforts of labor law inspectors).
74. Id. at 402.
75. Id. at 404 (stating that some inspectors rely on intimidation, fabrication, and
omission to meet their ultimate objective of extorting money from employers or will
offer to omit violations on their reports).

report, 76 waste Ministry resources, and decrease the effectiveness of
government regulatory efforts." Corrupt inspectors, however, may simply
be the product of a hostile and poverty-stricken environment.
Inspectors are not paid well, so they are given an incentive to take a
payoff to report that employer's businesses are in full compliance with
applicable laws. If reports continually come back to the Ministry of
Labor and Social Welfare stating that factories are in full compliance,
actual conditions will never be known, and will never be corrected.79
The solution to this problem is for the Ministry to open its eyes, realize
the corruption that is taking place and remedy the situation by increasing
the wages of inspectors to make them more loyal to their employer. This
would essentially require government support of the inspections with the
goal of improving conditions in the workplace. However, this is unlikely to
happen if Mexico continues to place reliance on foreign direct
investment because higher standards in the workplace means higher
operating costs, which could drive foreign investors to a country that
does not impose such high standards.
iii. Labor Union Indifference
Unions in Mexico are closely connected to the Mexican government
because they are subject to the jurisdiction of the Confederation of
Mexican Laborers, an extension of the Mexican government.8 ° This
interdependent relationship between unions and the government has
deferred any major union organization and has led to inadequate
representation of worker's rights." The fact that union leaders are not
willing to fight for union members
has a strong impact on the federal
82
labor law inspection process.
Without the protection of a union, the workers fear retaliation from
76. Id. (explaining that inspectors will fabricate federal labor law provisions and
employer violations in order to put pressure on employers to pay up).

77.

Id.

78. id. at 383 (stating that the monthly earnings of a starting inspector are US$
170. 87 percent of the inspectors believed their pay to be insufficient).
79. Id. at 404 (stating that these practices cause a significant obstacle to the
effective implementation of inspection policy and procedure).
80. See, e.g., MEXico: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 15, at 256 (in August 1991
the Political Agreement Between the PRI, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, and the
Confederation of Mexican Laborers was signed to confirm the direct relationship
between union organization and the Mexican government); McGuinness, supra note 60,
at 405 (describing the relationship as symbiotic).
81.

See, e.g.,

WILLIAM MCGAUGHEY, A U.S.-MEICO-CANADA

FREE-TRADE

AGREEMENT: Do WE JUST SAY No? 56 (Thistlerose Publications 1992) (referring to
unions as an instrument of worker suppression and control).
82. McGuinness, supra note 60, at 405 (stating that active worker participation is
key to inspection success).
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employers for statements said during an inspection and will refuse to
make disparaging comments.8 3 With no documentation of the conditions
inside a factory from the individuals who are working there day to day, it
is impossible for the conditions to be known and remedied. Again the
vicious cycle of corruption continues, where nothing gets settled and
workers are the worse for it. The interdependent relationship that exists
between the Mexican government and labor unions has been proven not
to be in the best interests of the Mexican working class and no matter
how hard workers struggle to gain union representation, it will never be
accomplished if the relationship is allowed to continue. 84 The potential,
but unlikely, solution to this problem is for citizens of the Mexican
working class to join and become a strong and prominent force with the
ultimate goal to dissolve this long-term relationship and gain the
recognition that they deserve. Another potential solution is for foreign
corporations doing business in Mexico to realize the injustice that occurs
to workers who are not adequately represented by a union and assist in
making Mexico a unionized country by demanding union workers to be
the only workers who will be hired in their factories. In order for this to
be accomplished, international corporations need to be less attuned to
self-interest and maximizing profits and more attuned to human interests.
Perhaps this could be accomplished by giving monetary incentives to
complying foreign corporations, provided by their home country. This
would benefit the Mexican working class, the Mexican economy, and
the foreign country because they would be able to continue to reap the
benefits of manufacturing in Mexico.
b. The Issuance of Monetary Sanctions
If an employer is found to be in violation of federal labor law, the
Ministry of Labor issues monetary sanctions, which are imposed to try to
discourage further violations.85 However, the sanctions are minute and
ineffectual when imposed upon large corporations doing business in

83. See id. (stating that only five to ten percent of workers will ever make
declarations against the employer during worker interviews).
84. Crandall, supra note 4, at 178 (explaining how union leaders are more loyal to
the Mexican government, the ruling party, and the desire to appease foreign
manufactures than to the workers they are hired to represent).
85. F.P.A.A. art 40 (describing the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare's job as
"application of sanctions to those employers who violate existing labor standards.").

Mexico.86 Factories located in Mexico can afford to pay a minuscule
amount for violations of Mexican labor laws and are not dissuaded from
continuing their current illegal operations when they are part of a larger,
highly recognized international corporation that has multiple factories87
employing thousands of people and grossing millions of dollars.
Millions of dollars saved and earned by locating their factories on
Mexican soil is more than enough incentive to violate federal labor laws
when the sanction only amounts to 1/10,000 of the money earned. 88 If
the Ministry of Labor is serious about doing away with federal labor law
violations, it is imperative that the sanctions imposed be increased. Not
only will this help to stop violations, but it will also give the Ministry of
Labor more money to compensate its inspectors and remedy factory
conditions.
Perhaps Mexico has legitimate reservations about imposing greater
sanctions on businesses that fail to comply with federal labor law while
conducting business on Mexican soil. If higher sanctions are administered,
foreign businesses may find it more profitable to run their factories in a
different country. 89 Factually, the Mexican government has an economic
incentive not to impose greater sanctions on international businesses
because foreign direct investment provides the Mexican economy with
much needed employment, technology, and diversity.90 But, the exploitation
of Mexican workers is not the only alternative available to attain these
goals.

86. McGuinness, supra note 6, at 15 (noting that the average sanction in 1996 was
equal to US$100).
87. McGaughey, supra note 81, at 60 (describing list of United States companies
in the Maquiladora region, including General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Zenith, and
General Electric); GM generated more than $32 billion in cash in 2002 available at
www.gm.com/company/investor_information/fin-res/?Section=company&layer=-Investo
r&action=open&page=4 (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
88. Calculation performed using US$ 1 million dollars divided by 100, the average
sanction for violation of labor laws, to obtain 1/10,000.
89. See Magdeline R. Esquivel & Dr. Leoncio Lara, Practitioner'sNote, The
MaquiladoraExperience: Employment Law Issues in Mexico, 5 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV.
AM. 589 (1999) (stating that many foreign corporations look at Mexico as an offshore
production site with cheap labor).
90. Laurie J. Bremer, PregnancyDiscriminationin Mexico's MaquiladoraSystem:
Mexico's Violation of its Obligations Under NAFTA and the NAALC. 5 NAFTA: L. &
Bus. REV. AM. 567, 583 (1999) (listing the benefits of foreign direct investment as
diversifying the market place, advancing technology, and increasing employment and
cost efficiency).
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III. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE NORTH AMERICAN
SOCIAL DUMPING THEORY

A. Legislation ProtectingForeignDirect Investment
Mexico has adopted legislation that encourages foreign direct investment
and allows foreign corporations easy access into Mexico.9' It was not
always this way." In 1973 the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and
to Regulate Foreign Investment ("The Law") was adopted with the
purpose to avoid the sale of already established Mexican companies to
foreign investors, to generally restrict foreign participation in Mexican
companies to a maximum of forty-nine percent, and, in some sectors, to
keep foreign investment out of the Mexican economy altogether. 93 The
Law allowed the Mexican government to retain a sufficient amount of
control over foreign investors because The Law contained a detailed list
of conditions that had to be followed and the appropriate Mexican
authorities analyzed each step made by a foreign investor.94
In order to police The Law, Regulations to The Law to Promote
Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment were created in
May of 1989. 95 The Regulations represented a more liberal interpretation of
The Law and a more lenient attitude towards foreign investing.9 6 The
Regulations liberalized more economic activities and allowed foreign
ownership without the need of prior authorization from authorities. 97 In
91.

See upcoming discussion on the

FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW

(1993), 33 I.L.M.

605.
92. See, e.g., Brandon W. Freeman, Comment, An Overview of Foreign Direct
Investment in Mexico, 3-AUT NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 123, 123-24 (listing several
policies that have discouraged foreign direct investment in Mexico for over seventy
years, including: restraints on the transfer of Mexican stock, prohibiting majority
ownership and control by foreigners, discriminatory taxation, currency inconvertibility,
and political insurrection).
93. Jorge Cervantes, Special Commentary: Mexico's Foreign Investment Laws and
Regulations, in MEXICAN LAW LIBRARY VOLUME 1 239 (William D. Signet ed., West

Publishing 1997).
94. Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment
(1973).
95. REGULATIONS TO THE LAW TO PROMOTE MEXICAN INVESTMENT AND TO
REGULATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT in MEXICAN LAW LIBRARY VOLUME 1 169 (William D.
Signet ed., West Publishing 1997) [hereinafter the Regulations].
96. See generally, JORGE A. VARGAS, Mexico's Foreign Investment Act of 1993, in
MEXICAN LAW: A TREATISE FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS

119-26 (Jorge A. Vargas ed., West Publishing 1998) (outlining the significant changes
made by the Regulations).
97. Id. at 127 (stating that as a result of the provision in the Regulations allowing

order to incorporate the changing attitude observed in the Regulations,
as well as to satisfy the United States and other foreign investors that
such laws were not going to restrain business options, The Law was
repealed in 1993 and replaced with the Foreign Investment Law. 98
It is significant that the law, which once referred distinctly to regulating
foreign investment and was called the Law to Promote Mexican Investment
and to Regulate Foreign Investment, now is simply called the Foreign
Investment Law. Nowhere in its new goal, "to formulate the rules to
channel foreign investment into the Nation and to ensure that [foreign]
investment contributes to the national development," 99 does it mention
regulating foreign investors. Not only does the new law governing
foreign investment contradict the original law designed to regulate
foreign investment, but also one of the most significant aspects of the
Foreign Investment Law is that some of its provisions directly contradict
the Mexican Constitution.
1. The Mexican Constitution Versus the ForeignInvestment Law
The Mexican Constitution states that only Mexicans, by birth or
naturalization, are permitted to acquire land or water ownership 00 and
foreigners are prohibited from owning real property within 100
kilometers of Mexican borders and within 50 kilometers of Mexican
coastline. 1 ' These provisions were included to give significance to the
Mexican Revolution and to implement one of the purposes of the
Mexican Constitution, to protect citizens "from foreign and domestic
exploitation to all Mexicans." 02 The Foreign Investment Law, however,
dramatically alters these provisions.
The text of the Foreign Investment Law allows foreign investors to
control 100 percent of the capital stock in a Mexican enterprise 1 3 and
allows a foreigner to own property in the "restricted zone" if the real
estate is used for nonresidential purposes and the purchase is registered

foreign investors to obtain temporary ownership of Mexican corporations, foreigners are
allowed to participate in activities once reserved to Mexicans, including air and maritime
transportation, gas distribution, and mining).
98. FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW (1993) 33 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter F.I.L.].
99. Id.
100. The Mexican Constitution, art. 27 (stating that a foreigner can acquire land and
water ownership only if they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Relations to be
nationals and not to invoke the protections of their governments relating to the issue).
101. Id. art. 27 (referred to as the restricted zone).
102. See MEXICO: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 15, at 41.
103. F.I.L. art. 4 (allowing foreign investors to participate in any proportion in the
capital of Mexican enterprises, subject to three limitations contained in arts 5, 6, 7, and

8).
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with the Secretariat of the Foreign Investment Commission.I°4 The Foreign
Investment Law and the social policies of the Salinas administration
have also allowed foreign investment in areas that were once adamantly
restricted to Mexican control. 10 5 Through the enactment of the Foreign
Investment Law and the direct contradiction of the Mexican Constitution
designed to free Mexican citizens from exploitation, the Mexican
government has encouraged and protected foreign corporations and their
investments.
B. The North American Social Dumping Theory
It is a maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at
home what will cost him more to make than to buy.
-

Adam Smith

10 6

Many foreign businesses see Mexico as a source for manufacture,
offering a cheap workforce and flexible labor standards. 10 7 Mexico continues
to give rise to a young population of workers and an attractively low
average level of earnings. 1°8 The attraction that businesses have in
transferring operations from developed nations to developing nations to
take advantage of low wages and labor standards is referred to as social
dumping. 10 9 The theory that the United States and Canada will use
S

104. F.I.L. art. 10; see Freeman, supra note 92, at 125 (discussing the provisions of
the 1993 Foreign Investment Law and the expansion of foreign direct investment in
Mexico updating old policies to bring Mexico under the requirements of the North
American Free Trade Agreement).
105. See, e.g., TOM BARRY, ET AL., THE GREAT DIVIDE: THE CHALLENGES OF U.S.MEXICO RELATIONS IN THE 1990s 277 (Grove Press 1994) (detailing the increase of direct
foreign ownership of the petroleum and mining industry because Mexico lacked the
capital to tap into these resources).
106. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS

424 (Modem Library 1937).

107. See, e.g., Griselda Vega, Note, Maquiladora'sLost Women: The Killing Fields
of Mexico? Are NAFTA and NAALC Providing the Needed Protection?,4 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 137, 144 (2000) (listing some of the large companies in the Maquiladora
region to include Amway, Honeywell, 3M, Kenwood, TDK, and Dupont; see also,
McGaughey, supra note 81, at 60 (adds to the list of United States companies in the
Maquiladora region, including General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Zenith, and General
Electric).
108. See Esquivel & Lara, supra note 89, at 590 (citing Mexico's National
Population Council, estimating that Mexico's labor force will increase from 36.4 million
to 46.4 million between 1996 and 2005).
109. See McGuinness, supra note 6, at I ("social dumping takes place when
industrialists, in an attempt to avoid stringent labor and environmental regulations in the

Mexico as their social dumping grounds, which will result in grievous
working conditions for Mexicans, is called the North American Social
Dumping Theory.1" ° The Maquiladora sector located on the border
between Mexico and the United States is considered one of the most
important sources of cheap labor and foreign direct investment in
Mexico and provides a dramatic illustration of the North American
Social Dumping Theory."'
1. The MaquiladoraIndustry: An Example of Social Dumping
Created in 1965 by Mexico as a source to increase capital, technology,
and employment, Maquiladora plants are one hundred percent foreignowned corporations." 2 Located close to the Mexican/United States
border, the factories operate to import raw materials into Mexico for
assembly and then exporting the finished product out of Mexico to a
designated foreign country." 3 Mexico relies on the foreign direct
investment that arises from the operations of the Maquiladora industry to
provide the economy with employment opportunities, technology, and
diversity." 4 However, despite the fact that multinational companies
have been investing in the Maquiladora industry for over thirty years,
this has not led to an increase in wages or better working conditions
within Mexico." 5
a. The Minimum Wage
The Mexican Constitution states that the minimurrL wage of an
employee must be "sufficient to satisfy the normal material, social, and
cultural needs of heads of a family and provide for the compulsory

developed world, transfer their operations to the developing world.").
110. Id. at 3 (describing the North American Social Dumping Theory as the
opportunity for United States and Canadian industrialists to relocate their manufacturing
operations to Mexico in order to avoid high labor standards).
111. Esquivel & Lara, supra note 89, at 589.
112. Freeman, supra note 92, at 140.
113. See, e.g., Randal J. Rein, Maquiladorasand Their Legal Regime, in MEXICAN
LAW: A TREATISE FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS 151, 153
(Jorge A. Vargas ed., West Publishing 1998) (stating that maquiladoras were created in
response to the change in United States tariffs allowing only the value added to
components to be subject to import duties); see also MEXICO: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra
note 15, at 189 (listing Maquiladora's main activities to be assembly of automobiles,
electronics, furniture, chemicals, and textiles); see also, Freeman, supra note 92, at 141
(discussing how the Maquiladora sector is affected by the passage of the North American
Free Trade Agreement).
114. Bremer, supra note 90, at 583.
115. See Crandall, supra note 4, at 174 (stating that in fact wages and benefits have
declined 32 percent since 1980).
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education of his children."'1 6 The Federal Labor Law also states "[the]
minimum wage must be sufficient to satisfy the normal necessities of the
head of a family, physically, socially, and
' culturally, and to provide for
the obligatory education of his children." 17
United States companies that build their factories in the Maquiladora
sector of Mexico do not provide their workers with the sufficient
minimum wage called for in the Mexican Constitution." 18 The minimum
wage varies depending on the region of Mexico, but the average hourly
wage in 2002 was 40.10 pesos.119 This roughly calculates to about U.S.$
4.46 for harder, and sometimes, life threatening work that does not
120
provide a Mexican family with enough food to keep from starving.
Why would the Mexican government keep its citizens living in poverty
when all that is required is to pass a law mandating a raise in the
minimum wage? It appears that the Mexican government has the
philosophy that any job is better than no job, even a low-paying one.
Wages are kept low by the Mexican government to attract foreign
businesses looking to decrease their operating costs and increase their
profits. 12 1 Over one million Mexican citizens enter the workforce
each year. 22 In order to accommodate the demand for jobs, wages
are kept low so that businesses will invest in Mexico and decrease
Mexico's overall unemployment rate.1 23 Foreign investment does
increase jobs, but this is of no benefit when both parents and children
work to support a family and are still living in poverty. 124 One reason
for low wages has been connected to the influence that the Mexican
116.

The Mexican Constitution, art. 123(VI).

117.

F.L.L. art. 90.

118. U.S. NAO Submission No. 2000-01, available at http://www2.dol.gov/
ilab/programs/nao/public submissions.htm (stating that some Maquiladoras do not
comply with the minimum wage and force individuals to work for U.S.$ 3 to 5 per day).
119. http://www.collectron.com/costbenefit.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2004)
(minimum wage reflects the amount paid to workers in the interior cities of Mexico,
fully fringed, as of Jan. 1,2002).
120. Vega, supra note 107, at 144-45.
121. Isa, supra note 7, at 634 (stating that the Mexican government's fear is that
companies located in Mexico will no longer find it cost efficient to remain in Mexico if
labor costs are increased).
122. Ross PEROT, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY: WHY NAFTA MUST BE
STOPPED-NOw! 41 (Hyperion 1993).

123. Isa, supra note 7, at 633 (stating that for every US$ 1 billion in exports, 20,000
jobs are created).
124. The average monthly salary for workers in the Maquiladora sector of the
Mexican economy was 3,652 pesos or about US$ 400, available at http://www.
nmsu.edu/-fontera/sep00/featl .html (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).

government has
over workers' primary instrument for obtaining
25
unions.1
relief,
b. Unionization
"If I went to work in a factory, the first thing I would do is join a union."
- Franklin D. Roosevelt

126

The ability to organize was not always an option for the Mexican
working class, but because of the Revolution, the right was granted to
avoid the exploitation of citizens. 127 This does not mean,
however, that,
128
in practice, Mexican workers are given such a right.
In August of 1991, a political agreement between the Institutional
Revolutionary Party that rules Mexico, and the Confederation of Mexican
Laborers was signed to confirm the direct relationship between union
organization and the Mexican government. 129 One result of this relationship
is that union registry is controlled by government authorities who decide
which unions will be recognized and which ones will not. 3 ° The
relationship that exists between the Mexican government and workers'
unions has created employer resistance and inadequate government
support of unions. 13 This relationship has also created a work
force
132
where over 75 percent of workers are not represented by a union.
Unions can provide numerous benefits for its members.' 33 Unions are
created to provide equality between a worker and his/her employer. A
working relationship that would otherwise be a fight over superior
versus inferior becomes a common enterprise with the goal of getting the
job done accurately and efficiently when a union is involved. One of the
125. See, e.g., BOTz, supra note 17, at 20.
126. Thirty-second President of the United States of America.
127. The Mexican Constitution art. 123; F.L.L. arts. 134-35 & 354-55 (allowing
employers and workers the freedom to associate, meaning the joining of a group of
workers or employers in a temporary agreement for the defense of their common
interests).
128. See generally LaSala, supra note 5, at 327-35 (noting that the US NAO has
found continuing violations of Mexican worker's right to unionize).
129.

See MEXICO: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 15, at 256.

130. See BOTZ, supra note 17, at 35 (registering occurs with the Federal Labor
Secretariat who has often withheld or delayed registration to unions hostile to
government policies); www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/index.cfm.
131. McGuinness, supra note 60, at 405 (suggesting the interdependent relationship
between the Mexican government and union leaders creates corrupt leaders who are
engaged in self-interest, and not in the protection of workers).
132. Available at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/index.cfm.
133. The ensuing discussion on union benefits derives from the website of the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, available at
www.aflcio.org/aboutunions.
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major reasons for joining a union is to obtain higher wages and better
health and pension benefits.' 34 In 2001, full-time wage and salary
United States union members had median weekly earnings of U.S.$ 718,
compared with a median of U.S.$ 575 for wage and salary workers who
were not represented by unions.1 35 This is over a twenty-five percent
increase in wages. Unions are able to hold employers accountable for
actions that are in violation of worker's rights and remedy any
discrimination that occurs against a union member. Unions have also
been shown to help increase productivity because union members obtain
better training, work under regulated conditions, and can have a voice in
decision-making or complain about management. 36 This makes for a
happier, healthier employee who takes pride in their work because they
realize the benefits that flow from union membership. 137
Many members of the Mexican working class fail to see the benefits
of unionization, even when they are part of a union.' 38 Unions are too
closely correlated with the Mexican government for any adequate union
representation to take place. 139 Mexican unions look out for what is
good for the government, not what is good for its people.140 This lack of
union representation for workers creates two situations. The first being a
docile worker who fears to speak up about harsh labor conditions and
low wages because he or she knows there will be no recourse and no
support from fellow workers.' 4' The second situation is the worker who
was fired for his or her involvement in trying to organize a union and left
to support his family and fend for himself in a hostile labor
environment.142 With no one to fight for their rights and the fear of
losing one's job for asserting their rights, the members of the Mexican
workforce are forced to accept low wages and hazardous working
conditions. There must be a division between the Mexican government
and the creation and maintenance of labor unions. Without this division,
134.
135.

Id.
U.S.

Department of Labor-Bureau

of Labor Statistics, available at

www.bls.gov.
136. Available at www.aflcio/org/aboutunions.
137. Id.

138. Available at www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/index.cfm, as of 2000
(noting that many unions are not organized effectively to provide training, promote
safety incentives, encourage participation, or insist on rights).
139. McGuinness, supra note 60, at 405.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.

142.

NAO Submission No. 940002.

conditions will never change and workers will not receive the compensation
deserved and the benefits that derive from being a member of an
efficient and successful union.
c. OccupationalSafety and Health
Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution demands that work be conducted
under conditions that assure the life and health of employees.143 More
specifically, the Mexican Constitution requires an employer to adopt
adequate measures to prevent accidents in the use of materials for labor
and to organize the workplace such that "the greatest guaranty
compatible with the nature of the business may result for the life and
health of the workers."' 44 The Federal Labor Law provides that the
regulations adopted under the law shall have the purpose of preventing
employment injuries and insure work performed under conditions
guaranteeing worker's safety of life and limb. 145
The regulations adopted to implement the principles in the Federal
Labor Law are the General Regulations Governing Workplace Safety
and Hygiene ("The Regulations"). 146 The Regulations create provisions
for the execution of the Federal Labor Law with the intent to reduce
accidents and illnesses in the workplace. 47 The provisions within The
Regulations call for buildings and work sites to have safety and hygiene
conditions adequate to the type of activity conducted there. 148 Other
provisions include maintaining fire-fighting equipment, 149 employers
providing protection adequate to safeguard employees from injury and
accidents, 15 and in cases where workers are exposed to varying
temperatures; employers must modify equipment, adjust the temperature
through technological devices, or reduce labor time. 51
Despite these strict provisions regarding safety and health, for all
intents and purposes, the Mexican government does not recognize the
existence of occupational illnesses. 2 If illnesses are ignored and/or
143.

The Mexican Constitution, art. 123.

144.

Id.

145.
146.

F.L.L. art. 512.
General Regulations Governing Workplace Safety and Hygiene, in

MEXICAN
LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

81 (U.S.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Department of Labor Jan. 1993) [hereinafter "General Regulations"].
Idat art. I.
Id. at art. 9 (including, roofs, walls, floors, patios, ramps, ladders).
Id. at art. 52.
Id. at art. 45.
Id. at art. 152.

152. See, e.g., BOTZ, supra note 17, at 22 (discussing how known carcinogens
are present in many working environments on a regular basis, but there have been
no cases of occupational cancer in Mexico, suggesting a cover-up exists to deflect
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attributed to something other than working conditions, the public and
other nations will be unaware of the epidemic and no pressure will be
felt by the Mexican government to comply with the General Regulations
Governing Workplace Safety and Hygiene. 153 Conditions, therefore,
will stay the same and occupational illnesses will continue to be chalked
up to coincidence or bad luck.
It is probably the case that Mexico lacks the financial ability to train
personnel and acquire the equipment needed to accomplish. The Regulations'
strict provisions, but why is this not allotted for in the annual budget?
The cause for non-compliance can be linked to the competitive pressure
felt by the Mexican government to offer cheap wages and low health
standards as an incentive for foreign investment. 4 If wages and standards
are kept low, businesses will be more inclined to maintain their
operations in a country that increases their profits. But bringing in
foreign investment to support the Mexican economy is no reason to risk
the health and well being of thousands of citizens. In order to maintain
the balance between foreign investment and occupational health and
safety, the Mexican government needs to impose sanctions on violators
and use the money to improve conditions. In the short term this solution
may run off some investors, but in the long term, will entice more
corporations to invest in a safe environment that still offers hard working
individuals for lower wages than their home country.
d. Child Labor
The Constitution, the Federal Labor Law, and various other acts of
legislation prohibit child labor in Mexico.1 55 However, because most
families in Mexico live in poverty and cannot afford to raise 57a
family, 156 children are forced to enter the workforce at a young age.
The Mexican government largely ignores the provisions of the
Constitution and the FLL and an estimated five to ten million children
are employed illegally in jobs involving the exposure to dangerous
the harm that is being done).
153. Id.
154. Isa, supra note 7, at 634.
155. The Mexican Constitution art. 123; F.L.L. art.5.
156. The average monthly salary for workers in the Maquiladora sector of the
Mexican economy was 3,652 pesos or about U.S.$ 400, available at http://www.nmsu.
edu/-fontera/sep00/featl .html (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
157. Botz, supra note 17, at 28.

58

chemicals or machinery.
Mexico draws in foreign investment by offering employees who will
159
work hard for low wages and labor standards that are not enforced.
Women and men who accept these wages as the only alternative to
complete poverty are not bringing in enough economic subsistence to
care for their families. 16 Therefore, the only solution to the atrocity of
child labor is an increase in the standard of living, requiring a higher
wage for each worker and government enforcement of the words in the
Mexican Constitution requiring a sufficient minimum wage and a decent
standard of living. 16 1 But because the benefits of foreign investment
strongly outweigh the benefits of enforcement, Mexico continues to ignore
the provisions of its laws and indirectly encourages the exploitation of
its citizens. 62 A growing relationship between the United States and
Mexico, including the North American Free Trade Agreement designed
to benefit both countries, has not helped Mexico's labor
force, but
63
instead has worsened the situation by failing to address it.
IV. THE POLITICS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT

(NAFTA)

A. NAFTA and its Provisions
Prior to 1988, Mexico had already reduced wages to promote the

Maquiladora program, but had kept most of the economy restricted to
local control.' 64 President Salinas changed this when he came in power
in 1988. His policy was to alter economic reforms to accelerate foreign
investment in Mexico.' 65 In order to accomplish these reforms,
countries wanted to be assured that they would be protected while on
Mexican lands and would be guaranteed access to the United States'

158. Id.
159. Vega, supra note 107, at 144 (stating that businesses see Mexico as a source of
cheap labor.
160. See supra note 156 (Average monthly employee compensation).
161. The Mexican Constitution art. 123(VI); F.L.L. art.5.
162. Isa, supra note 7, at 641 (attributing Mexico's failure to protect worker rights
to internal economic pressure of promoting foreign direct investment at the expense of
human rights).
163. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA] (stating one of the resolutions of NAFTA to be the
creation of new employment opportunities and improvement of working conditions and
living standards in each country, but then failing to implement any means to accomplish
this resolve).
164. JOHN M. ROTHGEB, JR. U.S. TRADE POLICY: BALANCING ECONOMIC DREAMS
AND POLITCAL REALITIES 203 (CQ Press 2001).
165. Id.

410
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market. 166 President Salinas began negotiations with President Bush to
establish a free trade and investment
agreement that would open all of
1 67
Mexico to foreign investment.
The main goal of NAFTA is to promote economic development by
making the free trade of goods more accessible between Mexico,
Canada, and the United States. It accomplishes this by phasing out tariffs
in the textile, automobile, and agricultural industries over a fifteen-year
period and provides for nondiscriminatory foreign investment in any of
the three countries. 169 The United States' objective under NAFTA was
to remove existing barriers to foreign investment in Mexico. 170 It is
relevant to this objective, that the current Mexican Foreign Investment
Law replaced the former Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to
Regulate Foreign Investment during the same year that NAFTA was
being negotiated (1993).71

Under pressure to make sure NAFTA was

passed, Mexico adopted this less stringent law to assure the United
States that foreign investment in Mexico would be readily available
without the formerly imposed restrictions.
B. The Passageof NAFTA
NAFTA was passed following an enormous political struggle. 72 The
discussion of free trade began during the Reagan administration where
Reagan was adamant about creating a united Western alliance through
free trade policy. 173 These discussions continued into the Bush administration
where the controversy of NAFTA's passage began. 74 President Bush
166. See, e.g., PEROT, supra note 122, at 13.
167. ROTHGEB, supra note 164, at 203.
168. See John P. Isa, supra note 7, at 618 (stating the main goal of NAFTA is to
promote economic development by eliminating impediments to free trade in goods,
capital, and services among its signatory countries).
169. NAFTA, supra note 163.
170. Andrea E. Migdal, The North American Free Trade Agreement: An Engine for
Investment Within the Americas in MEXICAN LAW: A TREATISE FOR LEGAL PRACTITIONERS
AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS 386 (Jorge A. Vargas ed., West Publishing 1998) (listing

the nondiscrimination provisions that were included in NAFrA to ensure the objective of
United States foreign investment, including treating foreign investors in the same manner
as domestic investors).
171. See Comment Section III (A)(i).
172. See, e.g., Herzstein, supra note 8, at 124 (noting that NAFTA was the first
instance where one President had signed the agreement, President George Bush, but
another President had to present the agreement before Congress, President Bill Clinton).
173.
ROTHGEB, supra note 164, at 177.
174. See PEROT, supra note 122, at 15 (discussing how President Bush tried to fast

was feeling the pressure from President Salinas to pass NAFTA because
the Mexican president was at the end of his term, and fearing lame-duck
status, wanted to be assured that the agreement would be put into
place.1 75 Between U.S.$ 30 to 50 million was spent by the Mexican
government to lobby for the passage of NAFTA. 176 NAFTA continued
to be a major issue in the presidential election of 1992 and was used as a
tool for both parties in their political strategies. 177 The strongest proponents

of NAFTA were highly influential U.S.-based multinational corporations
who were eager to compete with foreign countries by utilizing NAFTA
to set up factories in Mexico that would lower operating costs and
increase profits. 178 One of the strongest objectors to the passage of
NAFTA was the American labor movement composed of laborers who
feared that the agreement would eliminate the opportunity for jobs in the
United States.179 Because there were no standards in NAFTA addressing
environmental issues, environmental groups objected and created a
group that would rally against NAFTA and convince others not to vote
for the agreement.' 80 Clinton eventually took a stance to support NAFTA,
but in order to gain the support needed to win the election, Clinton
conditioned his backing on the creation of labor and environmental side
agreements that would supplement NAFTA. 18'
The political pressures felt by two presidents and the pressure exerted
by Mexican President Salinas were the forces behind the creation of one
of the most influential and significant agreements involving three
countries, their economies, and their people. It is impossible to suppose
track NAFTA. The fast track enabled President Bush to negotiate NAFTA in secrecy
without the participation of Congress or notice to the public. The authority to perform
such an act is delegated to the executive branch under Article I, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution, which gives the President the authority to regulate foreign
commerce).
175. WILLIAM A. ORME, JR., UNDERSTANDING NAFTA: MEXICO, FREE TRADE AND
THE NEW NORTH AMERICA, 78-79 (1996) (stating that President Salinas met with
President Bush eight times and was pushing to accelerate the talks because a "premature
act was preferable to no agreement at all").
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 8, at 207 (discussing how NAFTA was used to
assemble a coalition to win the election by gaining the support of labor unions and blue
collar workers); see also James Shoch, Organized Labor Versus Globalization, in
REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR'S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY 282 (Lowell Turner, et al. eds., ILR Press 2001) (noting how NAFTA was
used by President George Bush as a campaign tool to woo Hispanic voters and business
interests in Texas and California).
178. Shoch, supra note 177, at 280.
179. Id. at 281.
180. Id. at 282.
181.

Speech by President Bill Clinton, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 20, 1992, at A37

(NAFTA is a priority, but "there are other things that have to be done before the treaty
should be implemented by Congressional legislation.").
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that such an important agreement could be adequately drafted under such
political strain and critics have argued against NAFTA on that basis.
C. Criticisms of NAFTA
Arguments have taken the form of Ross Perot's "giant sucking
sound," where it is believed that NAFTA has caused businesses to
relccate to Mexico because of lower operating costs and has therefore
relocated employment opportunities as well. 18 Other arguments focus
on the impact of NAFTA on the Mexican workforce and the complete
disregard of the agreement183to mention labor rights, work standards, or
pollution abatement goals.
Article 105 of NAFTA defines the obligations of the United States,
Canada, and Mexico stating that each government "shall ensure that all
necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of
the Agreement."' 184 Therefore, under NAFTA, only laws and practices
considered illegal trade barriers are subject to challenge. 185 Laws or
practices that are immoral or inhumane are allowed to remain even if
directly related to trade, since one country does not possess the authority
186
to impose its principles on another if the law does not inhibit trade.
This issue was the main controversy that was ignited when NAFTA was
proposed and which eventually led to the creation of the labor87side
agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. 1

182. See PEROT, supra note 122, at 41 (discussing Ross Perot's controversial theory
that NAFTA will cause American jobs to be lost to a country that can offer more workers
at lower costs).
183.

See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER AND JEFFREY J. SCHOTr, NAFTA: AN

ASSESSMENT 7 (Institute for International Economics Press 1993) (stating that some
critics referred to NAFTA as the meet and greet variety, rather than an agreement for
progressively upgrading standards and enforcement).
184. NAFrA, supra note 163, art. 105.
185. Isa, supra note 7, at 619 (stating that NAFTA was designed to be a trade
agreement, not a treaty of association, so its drafters restricted it to facilitate trade only).
186. Crandall, supra note 4, at 171 (stating that NAFTA could not be used to force
social change on Mexico by imposing United States laws).
187. Id.

V. THE POLITICS SURROUNDING THE PASSAGE OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR COOPERATION (NAALC)

A. The Supplemental Agreement That Won an Election
and PassedNAFTA
During his run for president, Bill Clinton promised the American
public a NAFTA with agreements that would protect the working class
and the environment. 88 Clinton envisioned an ambitious document that
would provide for international standards that each country would apply
and enforce. 189 What was created instead was a toothless agreement calling
for "national enforcement of national laws."' 190
Mexico was not overly enthusiastic to accept new agreements to a
document that was, for all intents and purposes, completed.' 9' When
Mexico realized that NAFTA would probably not pass in the United
States without these side agreements, Mexico folded and grudgingly
entered into negotiations to add the agreements. 192 Mexico, however,
was cautious about voluntarily surrendering their sovereignty and came
to the negotiations table with three noes: no reopening of NAFTA to
change any of its provisions, no hidden protectionism of Mexico and its
citizens, and absolutely no compromise of Mexican sovereignty. 93 The
three demands by Mexico meant that there could be no interference by
the United States or Canada with Mexico's enforcement of labor laws
without compromising Mexican sovereignty. 194 President Clinton's idea
of uniformity was crushed and replaced with a document that contained

188. Mayer, supra note 8, at 168 (stating Clinton's promise to the American public
to be that if he were elected, he would not sign NAFTA until effective supplemental
agreements on labor and environmental issues were negotiated and adopted).
189. Shoch, supra note 177, at 283 (stating that the original proposal called for
formation of independent commission that would have the power to ensure that its
countries enforced their labor and environmental laws).
190. Testimony of Ambassador Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative,
Before the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 14,
1993), in NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS (Daniel McGraw ed.,
ABA Press 1996); see also, MAYER, supra note 8, at 168-69 (discussing the belief of
Clinton's drafting team that Mexican laws were strong enough and that international
standards would not be in the best interest of the United States to impose because the
laws could be used against the United States).
191. Mayer, supra note 8, at 168.
192. Id. at 208 (noting how Mexico wanted the NAALC to be as weak as possible,
but was willing to make the agreement because it was eager to enter into NAFTA with
Canada and the United States).
193. Id. at 168 (stating the three noes of Mexico and also commenting on how
Canada used the similar strategy to negotiate NAFTA's supplemental agreements).
194. Id. at 169 (stating the promise that Clinton made to President Salinas that there
was no intention of using the supplemental agreements to undermine Mexican
sovereignty).
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its own set of noes: no obligation to have the same standards in every
country, no obligation to have the same enforcement procedures in every
country, and no authority of any country to have a say in how any other
country should implement the NAALC.' 95 Clinton was convinced to sign
the agreement, despite the lack of national standards, based on assurances
that Mexico had adequate labor and environmental
laws on the books
96
that provided for sufficient protection. 1
The desire for Mexico to be able to control its future led to the broad
provisions in the labor side agreement and resulted in a document that
has been referred to as the "toothless tiger."' 97 Influential Democrat, Senator
Richard Gephardt, who was a prominent voice during the passage of
NAFTA, stated that he would vote for NAFTA if the labor side agreement
was sufficient. 98 During the Congressional vote for the passage of
NAFTA, Gephardt did not vote for NAFTA, blue-collar workers did not
vote for NAFTA, unions did not vote for NAFTA,' 99 but Republicans
overwhelmingly voted for NAFTA. °°
B. The NAALC and Its Provisions
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation preamble
states that its main objectives are to expand the market for goods and
services, create jobs, improve working conditions, enhance worker's
195. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 8, 1993, Can.-Mex.U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1513 [hereinafter NAALC] ("Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to empower a Party's authorities to undertake labor law enforcement activities
in the territory of another party.").
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 90, at 575.
198. See MAYER, supra note 8, at 180 (noting that Gephardt wanted an agreement
that would improve Mexican labor standards, govern business practices, and provide for
worker training).
199. Id. at 204 (quoting Jim Jontz, Citizen's Trade Campaign chair "These side
deals aren't half a loaf. In fact, they aren't even half a slice. NAFTA is fundamentally
an agreement to protect investors, to encourage them to go to Mexico to take advantage
of low wages and lax environmental standards and enforcement. And nothing in the side
agreements announced this morning will fundamentally change that. NAFTA is still a
bad agreement for workers. It's still a bad agreement for the environment, it's still a bad
agreement for family farmers, it's still a bad agreement for consumers.").
200. Shoch, supra note 177, at 284 (stating the ending vote in Congress as 234-200
in the House and 61-38 in the Senate and noting that the higher the percentage of bluecollar workers and union members in a district, the more likely the representative was
likely to vote against the passage of NAFTA); see also Herzstein, supra note 8, at 125
(noting that NAFTA had strong support from the business community and 130
Republican members of the House of Representatives).

rights, and encourage employers to comply with labor laws to maintain a

healthy work environment. 2°1 Reaffirming the demand for Mexican

sovereignty, Article 2 provides that each party can establish its own
labor standards limited only by the statement that they have to be "high
labor standards" and Article 42 makes each country's sovereignty
perfectly clear by stating that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be
construed to empower a Party's authorities to undertake labor law
enforcement activities in the territory of another., 20 2 In Annex 1 of the
NAALC, there are eleven principles that each country must promote,
including freedom of association, the right to strike, minimum
employment standards, and prevention of occupational injuries and
illnesses.20 3 But these principles are all subject to each country's own
domestic labor laws. 2°
If Mexico did not enforce the labor laws that existed before the NAALC
was put into effect and was resistant to the idea of a supplemental
NAFTA agreement on labor, 205 it is unlikely that a promise to promote
eleven labor principles subject to its own laws will compel Mexico to
change its ways. This is particularly true when the United States continues
to invest American money into Mexican corporations based on the
abundant source of cheap labor.20 6 What is needed is a labor agreement
that imposes equal standards on the nations involved. This way, by
comparison to a country's own laws, there would be a clear determination
of when labor laws were being violated without having to delve into the
language of a foreign nation's laws.

201. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 8, 1993, Can.-Mex.U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1502-03 [hereinafter NAALC].
202. Id. at 1502 ("Affirming full respect for each party's constitution and
recognizing the rights of each party to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to
adopt or modify accordingly its labor laws and regulations, each party shall ensure that
its labor laws and regulations provide for high labor standards, consistent with high
quality and productivity in workplaces, and shall continue to improve those standards in
that light."); see also id. at 1513 (Article 43: "no party may provide for a right of action
under its domestic law against any other party on the ground that another party has acted
in a manner inconsistent with this Agreement.").
203. Id. at 1515-16 (naming the complete list of guiding principles that each party
is to promote, including: freedom of association, right to bargain collectively, right to
strike, prohibition of forced labor, child labor protections, minimum employment
standards (including minimum wage), employment discrimination, equality of pay
among men and women, prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses, compensation
for on the job injuries and illnesses, and protection of migrant workers).
204. Id. at 1515 (stating that the guiding principles that the parties are committed to
promote are all subject to each party's domestic law and do not establish common
minimum standards for domestic laws).
205. Mayer, supra note 8, at 208.
206. Vega, supra note 107, at 144.
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1. The Dispute Resolution Process
The general idea of the NAALC was to encourage the exchange of
information between the three countries and try to rectify situations that
had already occurred, not to ensure that present standards were adequate
or being enforced. °7 This is most dramatically illustrated in the general
language of the agreement and the procedural operation of the NAALC.
The NAALC creates a Commission for Labor Cooperation, which
consists of cabinet level officials from the United States, Canada, and
Mexico. 20 8 This Commission oversees the implementation of the NAALC,
facilitates the exchange of information, and promotes cooperative
activities between the countries, including occupational safety, labor
statistics, and work benefits. 20 9 Article 15 states that each country shall
210
create a National Administrative Office ("NAO") at the federal level.
The NAO is the body responsible for collecting complaints that allege
labor law abuses. 2 11 The Office assembles information on the complaint
and issues a public report discussing the facts and findings. 1 2 If the
matter is not resolved after the NAO investigations, the Ministerial
Council ("the Council") may convene to examine the matter and
determine, through the exchange
213of public information, whether or not
there is a labor law violation.
If the matter is not resolved after the
Council has convened, an Evaluation Committee of Experts ("ECE")
will be established to analyze the situation and compose a final report to
be presented to the Council for review. 1 4
The final step afforded a NAALC party, if the ECE report is not
207. Mayer, supra note 8, at 208 (noting that Mexico wanted a weak agreement,
strongly resisting an independent international institution and subjection of domestic
practices to international review. The United States and Canada agreed, worrying that
international standards would be used against them).
208. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1504 (the Commission is composed of two bodies,
the Ministerial Council and the Secretariat, each having their own duties and obligations
outlined in Articles 10 and 12, respectively).
209. Id. at 1505; see also id. at 1504 (Article 9, outlining the structure and
procedure of the Ministerial Council).
210. Id. at 1506-07 (explaining that as well as creating the federal NAO, each
country must designate a NAO Secretary and be responsible for the operation and costs
of the NAO).
211. Id.
212. Revised Notice of Establishment of U.S. National Administrative Office and
Procedural Guidelines, 59 Fed. Reg. 16660, 16661 (Apr. 7, 1994) [hereinafter the
Guidelines].
213. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1508.
214. Id.

adequate to resolve the dispute, is the gathering of an arbitration panel. 215 If
the panel finds a violation, the parties themselves may initiate an action
plan to remedy the violation.2 6 If the party
in violation
refuses, the
•
217
arbitration panel is reconvened and a fine is assessed•.
On its face, the
NAALC represents a straightforward approach to dispute resolution, but
in reality, because of its hasty drafting, the political pressures surrounding
its passage, and Mexico's demand for sovereignty, the NAALC is a
"toothless tiger" that does not achieve its goal of enhancing worker's
rights.
a. Weaknesses Revealed
The NAALC has been viewed as having no real authority because
there is no mechanism to guarantee performance; it is simply an
agreement that relies on the spirit of cooperation
by allowing a country
28
enormous discretion in its implementation. 1
i. Discretion of the NAO
The first weakness in the NAALC is the ability of a party to have
complete control over its own NAO.21 9 Each NAO is created at the
federal level and controlled by federal officials.220 As previously discussed,22'
the involvement of the Mexican government in the issues of labor has
not led to increased worker's rights. The NAO also has the final word
on a majority of cases and if it does not find a violation, their decision is
final.222 It is fundamental for the successful enactment of the NAALC
that the NAO be free from corruption and independent of any pressures
that may exist that could alter the goal of enhancing worker's rights.
Related to the first weakness, the second weakness of the NAALC is
215. Id. at 1509 ("If the matter has not been resolved within sixty days after the
Council has convened, the Council shall, on the written request of any consulting party
and by 2/3 vote, convene an arbitration panel.").
216. Id. at 1511.
217. Id. at 1516 (Annex 39: the fine is referred to as a monetary enforcement
assessment and can be no greater than U.S.$ 20 million during the first year of operation
or no greater than .007 percent of the total trade in goods between the parties during
recent recorded years).
218. Vega, supra note 107, at 144 (describing the NAALC as a document based on
cooperation, not punishment).
219. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1507 ("Each party shall be responsible for the
operation and costs of its NAO.").
220. Id.
221. See Comment Section III (B)(l)(b) (discussing how unions are controlled by
the Mexican government).
222. LaSala, supra note 5, at 322 (describing the discretionary procedures of the
NAO if no violation is found).
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the discretion of the Secretary of the NAO to deny complaint submissions
under certain circumstances. 223 The circumstance that has the most impact
is the denial of a submission if the parties have failed to demonstrate that
appropriate relief has been sought under the domestic laws of the
individual's country.224 This guideline assumes that a party has the amount
of time and money to take his/her case through the court system and then
proceed to take the complaint to the NAO, not to mention the
psychological stress that can come from the fear of retaliation. If a
complaint is filed it is likely that the complainant will no longer be
employed by the entity who the complaint is filed against and is missing
the income from that source.225 In addition, after going through the court
system and getting nowhere, it is unlikely that a complainant will have
the resources, time, patience, or faith to try a different method of
resolution. The requirement that relief be thoroughly sought by domestic
means is impracticable and only perpetuates the current conditions.
ii. The Evaluation Committee of Experts and the ArbitrationPanel

The following flaws in the NAALC deal with the Evaluation Committee
of Experts and the arbitration panel. The ECE consists of three members
that possess expertise in labor matters, but are not affiliated with any

223. The Guidelines supra note 212, at 16661 (Section G.
Acceptance of
Submissions:
1. Within 60 days after the filing of a submission, the Secretary shall determine
whether to accept the submission for review.
2. In general, the Secretary shall accept a submission for review if it raises issues
relevant to labor law matters in the territory of another party and if a review
would further the objectives of the Agreement
3. The Secretary may decline to accept a submission for review if:
a. The submission does not identify clearly the person filing the
submission, is not signed and dated, or is not sufficiently specific to
determine the nature of the request and permit appropriate review;
b. The statements contained in the submission, even if substantiated,
would not constitute a failure of another party to comply with its
obligations under Part II of this agreement;
c. The statements contained in the submission or available information
demonstrates that appropriate relief has not been sought under the
domestic laws of another party, or that the matter or a related matter is
pending before an international body; or
d. The submission is substantially similar to a recent submission and
significant new information has not been made available.).
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., NAO Submission No. 940001.

party to the NAALC agreement. 226 This means that the only opportunity
for a member of the ECE to be unaffiliated with a party to the NAALC
agreement would be for the member to be from a country other than the
United States, Canada, or Mexico. Therefore, three countries that entered
into an agreement dealing exclusively with the activities between those
three countries are having this agreement implemented by three independent
individuals who do not reside in either country and are supposed to be
experts in the labor matters of the NAALC and each country's own labor
laws. It appears to be impossible for this to occur and a just outcome to
follow. The individuals who evaluate the actions of the NAALC nations
should be representatives from the three nations that negotiated and
signed the agreement. If the NAALC remains an agreement that only
seeks to simply exchange information, not enforce a country's labor
laws, there needs to be an understanding between the three nations of
law and policy. If there is a complaint filed against Mexico, a representative
who resided in Mexico for his/her life can bring to the ECE a
background of information on what has been done and what can be done
to remedy the problem. Three unattached individuals who simply look
at the information that has been collected without a sense of kinship to
the United States, Canada, or Mexico, are likely to make suggestions to
the Council that are impracticable and impossible to implement.
A second flaw is that if a complaint does not involve occupational
safety and health, child labor, or minimum wage standards that are
"trade-related and covered by mutually recognized labor laws", a
complaint will never get to the stage of arbitration because a panel is
limited to these three issues.2 27 This leaves issues of unionization, striking,
unlawful termination, and employment discrimination at the initial
stages of dispute resolution, at the whim of the discretion of the NAO
and not available for any type of sanction. Unionization should be included
in the arbitration list of issues, if only for the hope that unionization
would ensure sufficient wages, benefits, and humane working conditions
by allowing the worker's to have a voice and to stand up for their rights.
iii. Inadequate Worker Remedies
The NAALC does not accomplish the goal of enhancing worker's
226. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1508 (ECE members shall have expertise or
experience in labor matters, shall be chosen on the basis of objectivity, comply with a
code of conduct established by the Ministerial Council, and "be independent of, and not
be affiliated with or take instructions from, any party or the Secretariat").
227. Id. at 1509 (Article 29); see also LaSala, supra note 5 at 341 (listing the other
shortcomings of the arbitration process, including requiring a "persistent pattern of nonenforcement of a labor law" and a two-thirds vote to commence an arbitration
proceeding).
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rights because it denies the complainant any adequate recourse for labor
law abuse. The three most compelling reasons for inadequate recourse
are the long and tedious dispute
228resolution process, limited sanctions
imposed, and existing loopholes.
In order for a complaint to be considered thoroughly, it must go
through four levels of treatment.22 9 At the NAO level, the NAO has sixty
days to determine if a complaint will be accepted. 230 After a complaint
has been accepted, the NAO has four months to thoroughly investigate
the claim and issue a report to the Council. 231 The ECE gets another
four months to conduct their investigation and present a report to the
Council and an arbitration panel can take up to eight months to decide
whether or not to impose a sanction.232 If a complaint makes it to the
arbitration level of treatment, it has been in the NAALC dispute
resolution process for a minimum of 1,225 days.2 33 This is a long time
for a complainant to wait for an outcome. In situations involving
occupational health and safety, the delay could mean the difference
between life and death. If the NAALC is to be effective, it must resolve
complaints in a timelier manner to encourage aggrieved workers to bring
their complaints with the knowledge that the process will be fast and
efficient.
The fact that the NAALC is based on a method of cooperation and a
process of information exchange also makes the process tedious and
inefficient.235 The exchange of information about a country's labor laws
228. See generally Crandall, supra note 4, at 188-92; Isa, supra note 7, at 630, 648.
229. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1507-13 (the four levels of treatment consist of:
the NAO review and consultation, Ministerial Consultations, Evaluation Committee of

Experts, and an arbitration panel).
230. The Guidelines, supra note 212, at 16662.
231.
Id.
232. LaSala, supra note 5, at 324-25.
233. See Isa, supra note 7, at 648; see also, LaSala, supra note 5, at 340-41 (stating
that some cases that have been filed under the NAALC have taken anywhere from eight

months to three years and still remain unresolved).
234. LaSala, supra note 5, at 338 (describing how in one NAO submission it took
21 months for the case to conclude and the only outcome was the suggestion that
information be exchanged to apprise the countries of their obligations with no direct
restitution to the aggrieved complainants).
235. See generally Crandall, supra note 4, at 188 (describing the complaint process,
in summary, as passing through the NAO, through Ministerial Consultations, party
consultations, special council session, and an arbitration panel); but see Herzstein, supra

note 8, at 129 (explaining by demanding cooperation and requiring numerous
consultations and evaluation stages, the agreement is an important tool for enforcement
of national laws because it effectively thrusts an issue into discussion before the issue

does not address the complaint directly. Through this process, it is possible
to learn that Mexico has a law requiring an employer to have cause for
termination, but it does not return the complainant's status to that of an
employee. If an individual not only loses his only source of income, but
also risks mental, and perhaps physical harm, to himself for filing a
complaint against his employer, it is likely that the individual will not
bother to file a complaint if he can expect that he will not regain his job
position. Taken in this light, the NAALC perpetuates the labor problems
existing in Mexico by providing workers with the only process for
resolution that fails to resolve anything. The NAALC involves a tremendous
amount of talking between countries, but what is needed is less talk and
more responsive action to prove to workers that the NAALC is more
than a piece of paper, it is an agreement with the capacity to solve
problems.
The NAALC imposes monetary sanctions for violations of the
NAALC of "no greater than .007 percent of the total trade in goods
between the parties" during the most recent recorded year.236 Sanctions
for violating a provision of the NAALC, however, are hardly ever
imposed.237 Imposing a sanction comes at the end of a very long process
where there are numerous chances for the complaint to be resolved
before retribution occurs.238 Because of this long process, complaints
are thrown out or "resolved" before they have the ability to impose a
sanction. This leaves many complainants in a static position and employers
free to continue to violate labor laws without fear of sanction. Because
of sanctions' limited applicability, 239 many labor-related violations
remain a permanent fixture in labor operations because there is no fear
that the violator will have to pay a monetary sanction. Sanctions need to
be increased to levels where large corporations can feel the financial
blow when imposed. The sanctions could then be used to compensate
inspectors who will be more inclined to issue sanctions, which will lead
becomes highly politicized).
236. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1516 (Annex 39: the fine is referred to as a
monetary enforcement assessment and can be no greater than U.S.$ 20 million during the
first year of operation or no greater than .007 percent of the total trade in goods between
the parties during recent recorded years).
237. See Isa, supra note 7, at 649 (explaining that the negotiators of the NAALC did
not want to ruin the good relations with Mexico and Canada that had developed under
NAFTA by imposing strict sanctions for a failure to comply with the terms of the
NAALC).
238. Crandall, supra note 4, at 188.
239. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1511-12 (If the arbitration panel concludes that
there has been a persistent pattern of failure of a party to effectively enforce its
occupational safety and health, child labor, or minimum wage technical labor standards
then the panel can impose a monetary enforcement assessment in accordance with Annex
39).
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to better conditions in Mexican factories.
The major issue that should be entitled to all the levels of treatment
and to monetary sanctions is the constitutional right to organize and form
a union. The chance to form a union, without significant government
interference, could provide the Mexican working class with the ability to
fight for their rights and finally obtain the employee benefits that they
deserve for their hard work. However, with both NAFTA and the
NAALC providing no relief for this issue, Mexico's continuing reliance
on foreign direct investment, and foreign corporations desire for
increasing profits, the future seems dim.
2. Loopholes
Several loopholes have been discovered in the text of the NAALC that
allow Mexico to avoid its stringent domestic labor laws. One such
loophole is contained in the language of Article 49, which states that a
party has not failed to effectively enforce its domestic labor laws in the
issues of occupational safety and health, child labor, and minimum wage
standards if the government can defend its inaction by a reasonable
exercise of discretion or by allocating resources to other labor matters
that are considered to have higher priorities. 240 This provision provides
a party to the NAALC with a tremendous amount of discretion and no
standards with which to limit that discretion. Consequently, the Mexican
government could deem any domestic labor law violation excusable if
discretion was exercised or if their limited resources were utilized in a
different area of labor law. What is the purpose of this provision?
Although its probable purpose during the drafting of the NAALC was to
ensure President Salinas that Mexico was not losing its right to enforce
it creates a
its own labor laws, and therefore losing its sovereignty,
large potential for abuse by sidestepping the agreement all together. If
the NAALC wants to be a document with teeth, it cannot leave matters
242
of labor law violations to the discretion of the Mexican government.
A second loophole revealed in the NAALC is the fact that a claim that

240. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1513; see also, Crandall, supra note 4, at 188-89
(arguing this same criticism, stating that one critic suggested the exception to be so broad

that it "virtually guarantees that sanctions can never be invoked.").
241. Mayer, supra note 8, at 169 (describing the NAALC as a document that was
created to not undermine Mexican sovereignty).
242. It has already been demonstrated throughout this comment that the government
is likely to abuse this discretion for the sake of obtaining foreign investment.

has been filed with the NAO can be denied dispute resolution, even if
proven valid, if it does "not constitute a failure of another party to
comply with its obligations under the NAALC."2 43 This means that if
the NAALC does not mention a violation specifically, a party to the
NAALC can continue to violate its own domestic labor laws as long as it
does not violate their obligations under the NAALC. The NAALC was
designed to be a document of generality and permissibility to allow the
Mexican government to maintain its sovereignty; 244 therefore, it is
unlikely that the NAALC is able to cover every situation that may arise.
The third loophole that allows Mexico to avoid enforcement of its
domestic labor laws is the ability to unilaterally withdrawal at any time
from the obligations of the NAALC.245 Not only can a country withdraw
from the terms of the NAALC, but its withdrawal has no adverse
consequences, including the ability of the country to remain as a party to
NAFTA.24 6 This entails that the Mexican government can withdrawal
from the NAALC at any time if the pressure to enforce labor laws
becomes too great and continue to ignore violations without interference
from the United States. However, being that the NAALC was a necessity to
the passage of NAFITA, the United States would most likely be unwilling to
continue NAFrA, 247 as it exists now, and a new agreement would be
enacted, which might not be such a bad idea.
C. Cases Brought Against Mexico for Violations of the NAALC
The text of this comment so far has sought to prove that the language
of the NAALC is inefficient and does not help, but rather condones, the
treatment of the Mexican working class. The following discussion on
the submissions that have been filed under the NAALC will prove that
the NAALC is also inefficient when implemented. This inefficiency not
only arises from the broad language of the NAALC, but also from
Mexico's disregard of the NAALC's terms.
Implementing the NAALC fully would have a disastrous effect on the
Mexican economy because it would require Mexican employers to
243. The Guidelines, supra note 212, at 16661-62.
244. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1513 ("Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to empower a Party's authorities to undertake labor law enforcement activities
in'the territory of another party."); Herzstein, supra note 8, at 128 (describing NAALC's
objective as promotion of cooperation, not confrontation or accusation).
245. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1514 (Article 54: "a party may withdraw from this
Agreement six months after it provides written notice of withdrawal to the other
parties."); see also Crandall, supra note 4, at 191 (arguing that the withdrawal clause
actually condones the continued violation of worker's rights by permitting withdrawal
without any adverse consequences.).
246. Crandall, supra note 4, at 191.
247. Id. at 192.
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comply with the stringent labor laws outlined in the Mexican Constitution
and the Federal Labor Law.24 8 This would require Maquiladoras to pay
their employees a much higher wage, coerce all employers to comply
with occupational health and safety standards, and restrict the government
from interfering in employee unionization.24 9 Strict compliance would
make Mexico a less attractive place to invest foreign monies, which
would cause unemployment, and the possibility of greater poverty than
what exists currently. These are the reasons why twelve complaints
have been filed under the terms of the NAALC 210 with six of those
complaints against251companies being run as United States-based Maquiladoras
on Mexican soil.
On February 14, 1994, two submissions were filed with the U.S. NAO
against Honeywell and General Electric.252 Both submissions complained
that employers were violating the NAALC provision requiring each
party to Apromote the freedom of association and protect the right to
organize.
The Honeywell complaint alleged that 20 workers were
dismissed and threatened for their union organizing activities.254 The
General Electric complaint also alleged a dismissal of 20 workers from
union organizing activities and the thwarting of union organizing
through non-dissemination of critical information. 255 Both cases were
accepted by the U.S. NAO and investigated for validity. A report was
made to the Council stating that there were some coincidences regarding
the timing of the dismissals and the union organizing, but declined to
248.

See Comment Section II.

249. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1515 (naming the eleven guiding principles as:
freedom of association, right to bargain collectively, right to strike, prohibition of forced
labor, protection of children, minimum employment standards, eliminating discrimination,
equal pay for both sexes, prevention of occupational illnesses and injuries, worker
compensation in cases of illnesses and injuries, and protection of migrant workers).
250. NAO Submission Nos., 940001, 940002, 940003, 9601, 9602, 9701, 9702(2),
9703, 9901, 2000-01(2), available at http://www2.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/publicsubmissions.htm.
251.
NAO Submission Nos. 940001, 940002, 9701, 9703, 2000-01(2).
252. NAO Submission No. 940001 and 940002, respectively; see also, Leoncio
Lara, The NAALC's Consultations and Evaluations: The First Labor Cases, 4-Sum

NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. Am. 95, 101 (discussing the first nine labor submissions,
including those brought against the United States).
253. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1515 (Annex 1: Listing the eleven guiding
principles that each party to the agreement must promote).
254. NAO Submission No. 940001 (the complaint also alleged a significant
depression of worker wages).
255. NAO Submission No. 940002 (the complaint also alleged the violation of
several health and safety regulations).

take further action on behalf of the dismissed workers and instead
recommended that joint cooperative programs be instituted to discuss the
issues of right to organize and associate.256 The NAO seemed to only
focus on whether Mexico was enforcing its own labor laws and not
whether the company was involved in unlawful conduct.257 Consequently,
the case was dismissed and the 20 unemployed workers had no reprisal
simply because the NAALC only calls for an investigation into enforcement
and an exchange of information, not the authority to enforce a country's
own labor laws.258
The most recent submission involved Autotrim and Customtrim, two
subsidiaries of Breed Technologies, a Florida-based corporation where
workers sew and glue leather covers on steering wheels and gearshifts.259
In a petition to the U.S. NAO, the complainants alleged that the Mexican
government had persistently failed to enforce occupational and safety
laws in violation of the Federal Labor Law by conducting inefficient
inspections, not investigating reports of violations, failure to ensure
training 260 , and failing to assess fines for apparent violations. Wages

were also exceptionally low and a majority of the workers experienced
muscular-skeletal injuries and toxic exposure illnesses. 26' Mexican
workers reluctantly filed the submission after two years of pleading with
and receiving no response from the Mexican government. 2 62 The U.S.
NAO accepted the submission and an investigation was conducted
validating the claims,263 however, the only action taken was a Ministerial
Declaration that a group should be gathered to talk about the health and

256. LaSala, supra note 5 at 327-28.
257. Id.
258. NAALC, supra note 201, at 1503 (stating the objectives of the NAALC to be
improvement of working conditions, promotion of labor principles, and the publication
and exchange of information); see also NAO Submission No. 940003 (discussing a
complaint filed alleging employers of a subsidiary of the Sony Corporation had fired
workers because of union activities. Similarly, as in the Submissions discussed in the
text, the U.S. NAO's investigation focused on whether Mexico enforced its labor laws,
not whether the subsidiary had actually violated those laws. The case, however, was
taken to the Ministerial Councils and the Council mandated an inspection in Mexican
labor laws. The terminated employees, however, were never returned to their former
employment positions).
259. NAO Submission No. 2000-01; see also id. (a companion case to the discussed
Submissions. DuroBag, a Kentucky-based corporation responsible for the production of
high-quality shopping bags that moved operations to Mexico to take advantage of low
wage labor for high volume production. This complaint alleged the firing of key leaders
in organizing a union, low wages, and hazardous working conditions).
260. Id. (workers testified that the Maquiladora gave them no instruction on how to
handle tools, such as sharp scalpels, and how to avoid toxic inhalation of the glue).
261. Id. (noting that workers average salary was U.S.$ 3 to 5 per day).
262. Id.
263. Id.
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safety problems that had been discovered.2 6 In a letter written by Rosario
Ortiz, the president of the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras, to
U.S. Secretaries Chao and Abascal she expressed her extreme disappointment
in the handling of the case. 261
Various other submissions include a complaint filed against a
subsidiary of the Han Young Corporation 266 alleging various violations
of Mexican labor laws, including harassment of employees attempting to
unionize and occupational health and safety issues 267 and complaints in a
Connecticut-based Maquiladora of low wages, abusive supervisors,
sexual harassment, daily and handling of asbestos.268 One submission
alleged pregnancy-based discrimination in the Maquiladora sector, 269
where women applying for jobs were routinely submitted to pregnancy
exams through urine samples, inquiries about menses schedules, sexual
activities, and birth control.27 ° If the women were found to be pregnant,
they were denied the opportunity of employment.27 1
V. CONCLUSION: A RACE TO THE BOTTOM

The history of Mexico illustrates the reason why the Mexican
Revolution was fought; generally, Mexico and its citizens did not want
to be dominated by a class that took unfair advantage of their human
resources. Almost one hundred years later, it appears that Mexico may
264. Letter from Rosario Ortiz to Labor Secretaries Chao and Abascal (Sept 6,
2002), available at http://mhssn.igc.org/naftal3.htm. (the Declaration only gathered a
group to talk about incidents of health and safety that had already been documented.
There was no plan or action created to ameliorate the problems. The Declaration ignores
the worker's complaints and provides no recourse for workers who risked their jobs to
bring violations to the attention of the NAFTA parties. "A set of discussions without
public commitment to action cannot lead to a real change.").
265. Id. (stating that more than a dozen workers testified to the incapacitating
illnesses and injuries at Autotrim and Customtrim and the overall failure of the Mexican
government to assist in making any improvements).
266. NAO Submission No. 9702 (the Han Young plant produces trailer platforms
for Hyundai Precision of America, a subsidiary of the Korean Hyundai Corporation).
267. Id.
268. NAO Submission No. 9703.
269. NAO Submission No. 9701; See also, Lance Compa, Free Trade, Fair Trade,
and the Battle for Labor Rights, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR'S QUEST FOR
RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 325 (Lowell Turner et al. eds., ILR Press

2001) (discussing the discriminatory pregnancy testing case in detail).
270. U.S. companies engaged in such conduct: Sunbeam-Oster (FL), General
Motors (MI), Carlisle Products (AZ), Coyote Pet Products (CA), Johnson Controls (WI),
GENICOM (VA).
271. NAO Submission No. 9701.

be repeating history. Mexico's desire to improve its economy has led to
dependency on other nations to bring in foreign corporations looking to
cut operating costs and boost profits by lowering the working conditions
in their factories located on Mexican soil. The desire for foreign investment
forces the government to make Mexico as attractive as possible by
conveniently looking the other way and failing to adequately enforce
laws enshrined in the Mexican Constitution. Agreements designed to entice
Mexico to recognize worker's rights are poorly drafted and incapable of
preventing such behavior. A new agreement must be created between
Mexico and the countries that are utilizing Mexico's workforce in their
operations.
It would not be enough to create a new agreement between Mexico,
the United States, and Canada because other countries utilize Mexico's
labor force as well. What is needed is an international agreement that
must be signed by foreign countries wanting to locate their manufacturing
operations in Mexico. This would ensure that foreign corporations who
were not from the United States or Canada were not given an unfair
advantage in the market place because they were immune from such an
agreement. The agreement would put all corporations in Mexico on the
same footing and force them to compete through quality products, safe
working environments, and union benefits, not human rights violations.
Mexico would still have a competitive edge against other countries that
offer a cheap workforce and less stringent labor and environmental laws
because of its location; it is in close proximity to two highly developed
nations who are heavily involved in importing and exporting. The
United States and Canada would still have a neighbor to the South who
continued to offer cheaper labor, a hardworking labor force, and quality
products made by happy, healthy employees.
The new agreement must thoroughly address the issues of labor law
enforcement and impose standards that are adequate, yet distinct for
each country. It is impossible to create an agreement that would impose
uniform standards for all countries involved. Not only would Mexico
refuse to adhere to this agreement because of the fear of losing its
sovereignty, it would be impracticable to impose the same standards on
developed nations that have a different history and legal system, and
developing nations that require a competitive edge to thrive. The
agreement must be free of loopholes that would allow governments
room for abuse of discretion and must provide for a timely and efficient
dispute resolution process that gives workers retribution and faith in a
system that works. Although an agreement between all countries
requiring each one to create, maintain, and enforce adequate labor laws
would be the solution to solving the problem; it is highly implausible
that such a feat could ever be accomplished without destroying
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sovereignty among nations. For now, Mexico and the foreign countries
doing business in Mexico will have to be the trendsetters.
Thorough negotiations and careful drafting of the revised labor
agreement is essential to its success. The agreement should be drafted
during a time when it is not essential to the passing of another major
agreement and should not be used as a political tool to win a presidential
election. Overall, this new agreement must be lenient enough to
recognize Mexican sovereignty, but also recognize the rights that the
Mexican Working class obtained from fighting and winning a revolution.
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